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Abstract
Background: The Global Fund is under pressure to improve its rationing of financial support. This study describes the GF’s
pattern of disbursements in relation to total health expenditure (THE), government health expenditure (GHE), income status
and the burden of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. It also examines the potential for recipient countries to increase domestic
public financing for health.
Methods: This is a cross-sectional study of 104 countries that received Global Fund disbursements in 2009. It analyses data
on Global Fund disbursements; health financing indicators; government revenue and expenditure; and burden of disease.
Findings: Global Fund disbursements made up 0.37% of THE across all 104 countries; but with considerable country
variation ranging from 0.002% to 53.4%. Global Fund disbursements to government amounted to 0.47% of GHE across the
104 countries, but again with considerable variation (in three countries more than half of GHE was based on Global Fund
support). Although the Global Fund provides progressively more funding for lower income countries on average, there is
much variation at the country such that here was no correlation between per capita GF disbursements and per capita THE,
nor between per capita GF disbursement to government and per capita GHE. There was only a slight positive correlation
between per capita GF disbursement and burden of disease. Several countries with a high degree of ’financial dependency’
upon the Fund have the potential to increase levels of domestic financing for health.
Discussion: The Global Fund can improve its targeting of resources so that it better matches the pattern of global need. To
do this it needs to: a) reduce the extent to which funds are allocated on a demand-driven basis; and b) align its funding
model to broader health systems financing and patterns of health expenditure beyond the three diseases.
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Introduction
The Global Fund (GF) is one of the major sources of external
development assistance for health (DAH) worldwide. As of the end
of 2010, it had committed US$ 21.7 billion in 150 countries to
support large-scale prevention, treatment and care programs
against three diseases [1]. Its proportional contribution to DAH
has risen from 1% in 2002 to 11% in 2010 [2] at which point its
annual disbursements reached US$ 3 billion for the first time [1].
However, the contribution of GF grants to total health expenditure
(THE) within a given country varies considerably. In some countries,
the GF makes a large contribution to overall health expenditure;
while in others, it makes a small contribution. The relative
contribution of the GF to all DAH also varies. Figure 1 describes
the contributions of different donors amongst the ten largest
recipients of DAH from 2003 to 2008 [2]. In India and Pakistan,
the World Bank was the largest donor, accounting for about 35% of
all DAH. But in Ethiopia, the Global Fund was the biggest single
source of DAH, with the World Bank playing a relatively small role.
And in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, the US and the UK
governments together provided more than half of all DAH.
Historically, provided that applicants come from low and
middle income countries, the Global Fund’s approach to resource
allocation has been based on a demand driven model. As a
consequence, the Global Fund has had limited influence on the
pattern of grant allocation. Over time however, the Global Fund
has introduced policies to give it a greater influence over resource
allocation whilst maintaining the demand-driven principle. These
have included developing more refined eligibility criteria and
expecting countries to demonstrate evidence of ‘counterpart
financing’.
Presently, the Global Fund’s eligibility criteria are as follows:
low-income countries (LICs) and lower middle-income countries
(MICs) are automatically eligible; while upper MICs have to
demonstrate a ‘severe’ or ‘extreme’ generalised disease burden, or
at least a ‘high’ concentrated burden of disease within a segment of
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the population. Additionally, grant proposals from lower MICs
must focus at least 50% of the budget on underserved and most-at-
risk populations and/or ‘‘highest impact interventions’’ while those
from upper MICs must focus their entire budget on key
populations and/or ‘highest impact interventions’.
The Global Fund’s requirement for recipient countries to
demonstrate ‘counterpart financing’ takes the form of: (a) a
minimum threshold for government contributions to national
disease programmes; (b) demonstration of increasing government
contributions over time; and (c) improving the availability and
reliability of health systems expenditure data. The minimum
contribution is as follows: low income countries 5%; lower low
MICs 20%; upper low MICs 40%; and upper MIC countries 60%.
Finally, the Global Fund employs a prioritisation framework in
the event that there is insufficient money to cover all eligible and
recommended funding proposals. This is based on a three-part
composite index comprising income level, disease burden and
TRP recommendation category in which greater priority is given
to poorer and higher burden countries.
In recent months, the Global Fund has come under significant
budgetary pressure. Its eleventh round of funding had to be
cancelled. It is reviewing its approach to resource allocation with a
view to reducing the number of countries eligible to apply for
funding and tightening the criteria for the approval of grants. A
High Level Panel that was established to investigate the Global
Fund’s fiduciary controls has also encouraged the GF to also
incorporate an assessment of ‘financial risk’ in its approach to
resource allocation [3].
We therefore undertook a study to examine how the GF’s
pattern of resource allocation related to: a) the level and pattern of
total and government health expenditure; b) the income status of a
country; c) the burden of disease related to HIV/AIDS, TB and
malaria; and d) the potential to increase domestic public health
financing by looking at the proportion of GDP raised as tax, and
the proportions of the government budget spent on health and on
the military. We then discuss how the Fund’s resource allocation
strategy can be improved.
Methods
This is a cross-sectional study of all countries that received
Global Fund disbursements in the year 2009. We collected data on
GF disbursements in recipient countries between January 1st and
the end of December 2009 from spreadsheet files available on the
GF website. We extracted data on the number of disbursements;
the total amount of money disbursed; and whether the recipient
was government or non-governmental. We used disbursement
data rather than expenditure data because the former is more
complete and accurate.
We only looked at single-country grants as it is not possible to
determine the disbursements made to individual countries from
multi-country grants. Eight multi-country grants with disburse-
ments in 2009 were therefore excluded. A total of 110 countries
and 2 ‘territories’ (Palestine and Zanzibar) received GF disburse-
ments in 2009. However, because of incomplete and missing data,
Kosovo, Somalia, Palestine, Zanzibar and Zimbabwe were
excluded from further analysis; leaving 107 countries. Of these,
three (Colombia, Costa Rica and Myanmar) received ‘negative
disbursements’, meaning that monies were returned to the GF. In
these countries, the GF did not therefore make a contribution to
overall health financing and were consequently removed from
further analysis; leaving 104 countries in the final results of this
study.
Data on total health expenditure (THE), government health
expenditure (GHE) and development assistance for health (DAH)
for each country were obtained from the World Health
Organisation’s Global Health Observatory Data Repository
(http://apps.who.int/ghodata) and its’ Global Health Expenditure
Database (http://apps.who.int/nha/database/PreDataExplorer.
aspx?d= 2). Data on military expenditure were obtained from
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Military
Expenditure Database (http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex).
Figure 1. Top 10 recipients of DAH by percentage received from channels of assistance, 2003–2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.g001
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Population data were obtained from the World Bank. Data on
‘general government final consumption expenditure as a percent-
age of GDP’ were obtained from the World Bank (http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOVT.ZS). This calculates
all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and
services (including compensation of employees) as a proportion of
GDP, and is a rough measure of the proportion of GDP captured
as revenue by the government. To measure the burden of disease,
we adopted a methodology used by the Global Fund which
designates a score of between 2 and 8 for each disease, which is
then aggregated to form a composite score.
Results
A total of 862 disbursements which amounted to US$
2,604,733,440 were made to the 104 countries analysed. Of this
amount, 63% (US$ 1,642,453,949) was disbursed to government
recipients, and the remainder to non-government recipients. The
average disbursement to government recipients (US$3.16 million)
was slightly higher compared to the average disbursement to non-
government recipients ($US2.81million). Only 39 of the 104
countries demonstrated dual-track financing in which disburse-
ments are made to both government and non-government
recipients.
In 37 countries (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Botswana,
Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea,
Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, Macedonia,
Malawi, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Tunisia,
Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam), all disbursements were made
only to a government recipient; while in a further 8 countries
(Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, India,
Moldova, Senegal and Suriname), more than 90% (but less than
100%) of the total amount of disbursements was made to a
government recipient. At the other end of the spectrum, 28
countries (Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Brazil, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic), Cuba, Equatorial
Guinea, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Liberia,
Maldives, Mauritius, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru,
Romania, Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan,
Syria, Tajikistan and Ukraine) had all their disbursements made to
non-government recipients; while a further one country (Philip-
pines) had more than 90% (but less than 100%) of the total
disbursement amount made to non-government recipient(s).
The GF’s disbursements by ‘income status’ in 2009 was
progressive. Fifty-eight percent of its disbursements were to LICs;
while a further 33.8% were to lower MICs (Figure 2).
Total GF disbursements in 2009 made up 0.37% of all health
expenditure across the 104 countries. But their contribution to
individual countries ranged from as little as 0.002% (Botswana) to
53.4% (Democratic Republic of Congo). Overall, the GF
contributed 3.29% of THE in LICs, 0.22% in low MICs and
Figure 2. GF disbursements in 2009 by income group (US$).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.g002
Table 1. Fifteen countries with the highest Global Fund
contribution relative to THE.
Total GF disbursements as a %
of THE
Congo (Democratic Republic) 53.4%
Gambia 29.3%
Eritrea 25.0%
Guinea-Bissau 23.2%
Malawi 23.0%
Burundi 16.9%
Rwanda 16.8%
Papua New Guinea 12.0%
Togo 11.3%
Ethiopia 10.7%
Lesotho 10.7%
Tanzania (United Republic) 9.6%
Swaziland 9.4%
Liberia 9.2%
Timor Leste 9.2%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.t001
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0.07% in high MICs. The fifteen countries with the highest GF
contribution relative to THE are shown in Table 1 below. All
these countries are classified as low income, except for Lesotho,
Swaziland and Timor Leste which are low MICs.
Total GF disbursements in 2009 equalled about 0.74% of total
government health expenditure (GHE) across the 104 countries;
ranging from 0.003% in Botswana to 223% in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (where all the disbursements were made to
non-government recipients). The fifteen countries with the highest
GF contribution relative to total GHE are shown in Table 2
below. Five countries (Sierra Leone, Haiti, Laos, Cambodia and
Tajikistan) from Table 2 do not appear in Table 1; while five
countries from Table 1 are absent in Table 2 (Papua New Guinea,
Lesotho, Tanzania, Swaziland and Timor Leste).
As mentioned earlier, 63% of the value of all GF disbursements
in 2009 was made to governments. GF disbursements to
government amounted to 0.47% of GHE across the 104 countries,
but with considerable inter-country variation. The fifteen coun-
tries with the highest GF contribution to government relative to
Table 2. Fifteen countries with the highest Global Fund
contribution relative to total government health expenditure.
Total GF disbursements as a % of total
government expenditure on health
Congo (Democratic Republic) 223.0%
Guinea-Bissau 90.8%
Gambia 58.5%
Eritrea 56.1%
Togo 47.1%
Sierra Leone 41.2%
Malawi 39.6%
Rwanda 38.9%
Burundi 36.7%
Cambodia 34.1%
Haiti 32.9%
Laos 30.4%
Tajikistan 25.3%
Liberia 23.2%
Ethiopia 22.6%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.t002
Table 3. Fifteen countries with the highest Global Fund
contribution to government relative to total government
health expenditure.
GF disbursements to government as a percentage of
total government expenditure on health
Guinea-Bissau 90.8%
Eritrea 56.1%
Gambia 52.0%
Sierra Leone 41.2%
Malawi 39.6%
Rwanda 38.9%
Cambodia 34.1%
Burundi 31.5%
Laos 30.4%
Ethiopia 21.8%
Uganda 17.8%
Lesotho 15.7%
Swaziland 14.9%
Togo 14.9%
Timor-Leste 12.9%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.t003
Figure 3. Scatter plot of per capita GF disbursements (US$ AER) and per capita THE minus per capita GF disbursement (US$ AER).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.g003
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total government health spending are shown in Table 3 below. In
three countries, more than half the government’s health expen-
diture appears to be based on Global Fund grants.
Although we found a progressive pattern of funding across the
different income groupings of countries, the absolute level of
health funding from other sources does not appear to influence the
GF’s pattern of resource allocation. For example, we found no
correlation between per capita GF disbursements and per capita
THE minus Global Fund disbursements (Figure 3). Similarly,
there was no apparent pattern in the relationship between per
capita GF disbursement to government and per capita government
health expenditure (Figure 4).
When we examined the relationship between burden of disease
score with per capita THE we found that countries with a lower
burden of disease score tended to have higher levels of THE
(Figure 5). This is not surprising given the tendency for poorer
countries to have a higher burden of disease.
However, there was a positive correlation between per capita
GF disbursement and the burden of disease score (Figure 6) which
Figure 4. Scatter plot of per capita GF disbursements to government (US$ AER) and per capita government health expenditure (US$
AER).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.g004
Figure 5. Scatter plot of per capita THE (US$ AER) and burden of disease score.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.g005
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means that the GF does, to some degree, compensate for the low
levels of spending in countries with a high burden of disease.
The twenty-two countries (and their governments) listed in
Tables 1, 2 and 3 are all, to a lesser or greater extent, ‘dependent’
on the Global Fund in the sense that should the Global Fund stop
making disbursements, there would be a significant financial
impact on total and/or government health expenditure. Table 4
combines all the countries and data from Tables 1, 2 and 3 and
adds six other data points: per capita THE; per capita GHE; THE
as a percentage of GDP; GHE as a percentage of total government
expenditure; DAH as a percentage of THE; and military
expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure.
Amongst these countries, per capita THE varies from US$3.33
in the DRC to US$155.78 in Swaziland. Thus, although these
countries may all be relatively ‘dependent’ on the Global Fund,
those with low levels of per capita THE will be more reliant on
Global Fund grants in absolute terms for the provision of basic and
essential of health care. Table 4 also shows considerable
differences in the contribution of all DAH to THE, ranging from
8.8% in Cambodia to 65.6% in Eritrea. There was also a ten-fold
difference in GHE as a percentage of total government
expenditure between the DRC (1.7%) and Tanzania (18.1%).
Only 12 countries in Table 4 had data on ‘government final
consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP’, with figures
ranging from 7.9% to 28.3%, with an average of 15.5%. This is
surprisingly high compared to the average across all low income
countries which is 10.0%. Only 12 countries in Table 4 had data
on military expenditure of which three (Cambodia, DRC and
Uganda) spent more on the military than on health.
These data however reveal most information when examined
on a country by country basis. For example, per capita THE in the
DRC was only US$3.33 in 2009, of which only US$0.80 came
from government budgets. By contrast, the Global Fund
contributed more than half (53.4%) of all health expenditure,
and nearly double the amount spent by the government. However,
THE as a percentage of GDP was only 2% and Government Final
Consumption Expenditure as a % of GDP was 7.9%, which
suggests that there is the potential to expand the domestic funding
base for health. Furthermore, government expenditure on health
as a % of total government expenditure was only 1.7% (far from
the Abuja Declaration target of 15%) and military expenditure was
more than double that of government health expenditure, both of
which indicate further potential to increase domestic public
spending on health.
The case of the Gambia offers a contrast. Here, the Global
Fund contributes 29.3% of all health expenditure. However, THE
as a percentage of GDP is 6% (three times that of the DRC) while
Government Final Consumption Expenditure as a % of GDP is
15.9% (more than double that of the DRC). And government
health expenditure as a % of total government expenditure is
11.6%, which is nearly seven times more than the DRC and not
far from the Abuja Declaration target of 15%. The potential to
expand the domestic funding base for health in Gambia is
therefore less than in the DRC.
Finally, in the case of Liberia, 9.2% of THE was funded by the
Global Fund. This is a much smaller proportion than Gambia
even though per capita THE and the burden of disease score in
Liberia is similar to that of Gambia. However, external sources of
funding made up 47% of THE in Liberia which means that other
donors played a bigger role in supporting the Liberian health
system than in the Gambia. Total health expenditure as a
proportion of GDP is relatively high (13.2%) as is GHE as a
proportion of total government expenditure (17.2%) which
suggests less potential for increasing domestic finance for health
in Liberia compared to the Gambia and DRC.
Discussion
The findings described above raise a number of issues about the
Global Fund’s contribution to health spending in low and middle
income countries. Across the 104 countries that were studied, total
GF disbursements in 2009 made up only 0.34% of THE, while GF
disbursements to government made up 0.47% of GHE. Overall,
the Fund’s contribution to health improvement is therefore
relatively small.
However, on average, the GF’s contribution to poorer countries
is higher. Global Fund disbursements made up 3.29% of THE and
Figure 6. Scatter plot of per capita GF disbursement (US$ AER) and burden of disease score.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034749.g006
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5.4% of GHE across all LICs. In several countries, GF
disbursements accounted for more than 10% of THE; and in
the DRC, the sum of GF disbursements was more than twice the
amount spent by the government on health. In Guinea-Bissau,
Eritrea and the Gambia, Global Fund disbursements to govern-
ment contributed to more than 50% of total GHE. This country-
by-country variation in the degree to which the Global Fund
supports health financing mirrors a pattern that has been observed
for overall DAH. For example, in 2006 DAH was estimated to
have contributed an average of $6 per capita to all low-income
countries (amounting to about just under 25% of THE); but the
variation in per capita DAH ranged from $0.50 to $27.77 [4].
Although, the Global Fund’s allocation of funds is progressive
when examined across the three main income groups (LICs, lower
MICs and upper MICs), we found a surprising lack of correlation
between the Global Fund’s financial support and the level of
health financing at an individual country level. No relationship
was found between per capita GF disbursements and per capita
THE (Figure 3), nor between per capita Global Fund disburse-
ments to government and per capita GHE (Figure 4). In other
words, levels of health spending from other sources within a
country do not appear to influence the Global Fund’s pattern of
resource allocation.
Since 2009, a number of LICs have become classified as lower
MICs and a number of lower MICs have become upper MICs.
Thus the amounts spent in MICs in 2010 and 2011 will almost
certainly have increased relative to LICs. This may not be
inappropriate as there is now a poor correlation between the
global distribution of people living in poverty and suffering from
the three diseases, with the official income status of countries. For
example, more than 70% of the world’s poor (living on less than
an income of $1.25 per day) now live in MICs (the majority in
Pakistan, India, Nigeria, China and Indonesia). MICs also now
have a larger total disease burden than LICs [5].
The extent to which the Fund’s rules for counterpart financing
influence the pattern of resource allocation could not be examined
because of the lack of data on government spending on disease
programmes, as well as the lack of a clear and agreed approach for
allocating ‘cross-cutting’ government expenditure on health (e.g.
on logistical and management systems or the salaries of generic
health workers) to specific disease programmes. This raises
questions about the validity and feasibility of making a distinction
between disease-based budgets and expenditure, and other budget
and expenditure categories that relate to the overall functioning of
the health system but which make an indirect contribution to
disease-based programmes.
In our study, 28 countries (27%) had all disbursements made to
a non-government recipient; while considerably more countries
had PRs that were entirely or predominantly governmental. We
found no obvious difference between these two sets of countries,
although an earlier study found that Global Fund grants to ‘fragile
states’ were mainly channelled to non-governmental entities [6].
The country-led funding model of the Global Fund means that the
choice of putting forward a government or non-government PR
will be mostly due to country-level factors rather than to any
strategic choice made by the Global Fund.
In spite of the demand-led nature of the funding model, a
positive correlation was found between per capita Global Fund
disbursements and burden of disease. This will have been partly
due to the Fund’s eligibility criteria. However, the correlation not
strong, and echoes findings from another analysis which concluded
that the Global Fund needed to improve the alignment of its grants
for malaria control with the epidemiological pattern of malaria [7].
Currently, the funding model which determines the Global
Fund’s pattern of resource allocation consists of four components.
The first are the demand-driven or country-led factors which
determine if a country decides to apply to the Global Fund or not,
and what goes into the grant applications. The second are quality
and performance-related factors comprising the quality of the
grant application which has to gain the approval of the TRP, and
subsequent grant performance which influences the rate and
completeness of grant disbursements. The third are the Global
Fund’s eligibility and prioritisation criteria (based on a country’s
income status and its disease burden) which provides an element of
supply-led resource allocation that is needs based. And the fourth
component is the Global Fund’s counterpart financing policy
which is designed to leverage government spending on the three
diseases.
Thus, the pattern of resource allocation is the outcome of a mix
of various demand-driven and supply-led factors, each of which
the Global Fund itself has variable degrees of influence. A key
question is whether the funding model can or should be improved
in any way.
For example, one recommendation might be to incorporate a
measure of ‘financial risk’ as an additional component of the
funding model to reduce the Fund’s exposure to fraud or
corruption by limiting the amount of funding to countries
considered to be high risk. In our view, this would be
inappropriate. While an assessment of ‘financial risk’ should be
conducted to influence the design of financial procedures and
fiduciary controls, the Fund’s resource allocation strategy should
be based primarily on a combined assessment of health and
financial need. Furthermore, those countries with weak financial
management systems and inadequate fiduciary controls are often
those in need of additional DAH and long-term systemic
developments.
But if the Global Fund is to improve the alignment of its grants
to a country’s ‘need’, it would need to reduce the relative
importance of demand-driven and country-led factors. As the
resource envelope shrinks and as demand increasingly outstrips the
supply of money, the current model will become more compet-
itive. Grant applicants competing over a more constrained budget
will force the Global Fund to apply more stringent rationing. But
the Fund could go in one of two directions. It could lean towards
the quality and performance-related factors, and decide to
preferentially allocate funds to better applications and better track
records of past performance; or it could lean towards prioritising
grant applications on the basis of need.
In terms of the latter, the Global Fund’s approach has been to
use a country’s income status to help it prioritise poor countries,
and to use a measure of burden of disease to help it allocate
resources to countries with lots of disease. However, a more
sophisticated approach may now be required. In the case of
assessing a country’s burden of disease, this is straightforward
provided there are good data. And where this is lacking, the
Global Fund is already working with other development partners
to improve disease surveillance. But because aggregated measures
of disease burden at the country level can mask the particular
needs of minority and marginalised population groups, the Global
Fund will need to ensure that such groups continue to receive
appropriate external financial support, not so much because of the
country’s level of financial need, but for socio-political reasons.
When it comes to assessing the financial need of a country, the
current funding model may need more substantial modification
because the income status of a country is a poor indicator of a
country’s need for financial support. This is due in part to the
discrepancy between income status and the prevalence of
The Global Fund’s Allocation of Scarce Resources
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e34749
household poverty, and to the fact that the cost of an adequate and
universal response to HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria programmes,
especially in high burden countries, can be challenging, if not
unaffordable, even for middle income countries.
Ideally, a detailed assessment of the actual cost of providing
treatment and prevention services in specific countries would form
the basis of assessing a country’s need for external assistance
(taking account of factors such as the degree and scale of poverty
amongst diseased or at-risk population groups; the unmet need
associated with other diseases, illnesses and health threats;
population density; the availability and quality of existing health
care infrastructure; and the price of key health systems inputs and
technologies).
Furthermore, a country’s need for external financial assistance is
not fixed. As shown in this study, many countries have the potential
to expand domestic financing for HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria
programmes. Assessing and measuring the size of this potential, as
well as the feasibility of realising this potential, requires an
examination of: the adequacy of THE and government health
budgets; the contribution of other donors; the potential for
increasing government revenue streams (e.g. through more
efficient and effective tax systems); and the potential to increase
the allocation of government budgets to health (e.g. by diverting
spending away from armaments). In addition, social and political
factors inhibiting an adequate or appropriate domestic response to
the three diseases would need to be considered.
Finally, in many countries, out-of-pocket expenditure makes up
a high proportion of THE (nearly half in some cases). This is a
form of financing does not permit cross-subsidisation or risk
pooling, and which is inefficient. Thus, the potential for a country
to make efficiency savings and equity gains through schemes to
pool health finance should also be assessed.
This is where the policy on counterpart financing becomes
relevant. Counterpart financing was primarily designed to avoid or
minimise a certain form of moral hazard in which funding from
the Global Fund would cause governments to abscond or weaken
their own obligations to fund HIV, TB and Malaria programmes.
However, it is also a strategy that could encourage positive health
systems improvements that extend beyond merely encouraging
governments to co-finance HIV, TB and Malaria programmes.
Such improvements might include expanding the domestic
funding base for health care and getting governments to raise their
budgetary allocations for health more generally. While not having
a direct impact on improving the coverage of HIV, TB and
Malaria programmes, they have the potential to make positive
indirect impacts on such programmes and to improve their
prospects for future financial sustainability.
However, the Global Fund’s current counterpart policy is
narrowly focused on the three diseases, and is also not without
some potential drawbacks. For example, it might inadvertently
result in the preferential allocation of funds to countries that are
already spending money on HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, rather
than getting the GF to compensate for low or poor levels of
domestic funding. Here lies a tension for the Global Fund. On the
one hand, it wants to use its grant-making power to leverage more
government health spending on HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria. On
the other hand, its mission to respond to people in need may require
the Fund to approve grants in spite of or because of government
neglect.
The counterpart financing policy may also threaten to distort
local priority setting. For example, through the Global Fund (and
other donors), the three diseases of HIV, TB and Malaria may
already be well-funded or even over-funded relative to other
priorities. The Fund’s counterpart financing policy might inad-
vertently accentuate this problem. Thus, the current counterpart
financing rules are on the one hand too generalised in that they fail
to accommodate the diverse and heterogeneous nature of
countries and governments; whilst on the other hand, are too
narrow and specific, in that they are focused only on government
funding for three diseases.
Conclusions and recommendations
The Global Fund is merely ten years old. In its first decade of
existence it developed a funding model that was designed to be
quick, pragmatic and country-driven. Its’ mission was to get
money out quickly and rapidly translated into the uptake of
services and treatments for HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria. The
Fund is now entering a phase that will require it to allocate its
finite funds more carefully and strategically. Although its funding
model already incorporates some explicit needs-based resource
allocation, this paper suggests that some modifications are in
order.
Given current financial realities, the Fund must first address the
tension between being a responsive, demand-driven funder and
being a more directive, supply-led funder. The Global Fund’s
strategy for 2012–16 and its Consolidated Transformation Plan
indicate that it is moving towards becoming a more supply-led
funder. They also indicate that the Fund will develop a more
iterative, hands-on and country-specific process for providing
future financial support to countries. In theory, this makes sense
from a technical and public health perspective, but it poses
potential threats to the benefits that are derived from the demand
driven and country-owned process of countries applying for grants
through periodic funding rounds.
Managing this tension between being responsive to country-led
applications and responding to the health needs of populations and
the financial needs of countries may require a more sophisticated
multi-track approach. One track might entail the Global Fund
providing funds to countries that need assistance and capacity
development in producing sound and appropriate HIV, TB and
Malaria plans. A second track would entail the continuation of the
country-led model of having countries apply for grants. And a
third track might entail setting of country-specific budget ceilings
and floors based on the Fund’s own budget, as well as an
assessment of the combined financial and health needs of recipient
countries. But as suggested earlier, this third track should involve a
more sophisticated assessment of health and financial need than is
currently the case.
As far as counterpart financing is concerned, the Global Fund
should revise its policy so that it uses its grant-making powers to
leverage improvements in health systems financing overall, rather
than to just increase domestic financing for three diseases. At the
same time, it would need to ensure that the counterpart financing
requirement does not inadvertently penalise communities in need
of support because their governments have failed to make
adequate commitments to health. This too would be enabled by
the Global Fund adopting a more supply-led funding model in
which it could be more directive in channelling funds to non-
governmental recipients.
In addition to raising questions about the tension between being
a demand-driven and supply-led donor, this discussion also
implicitly refers to the tension between being a disease-based
donor and needing to take a more comprehensive health systems
perspective. As funding becomes constrained and questions about
financial sustainability and efficiency become more important, the
Fund must consider how it catalyse the systemic developments that are
necessary for securing the long term sustainability, effectiveness
and efficiency of HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria programmes. This
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should include revisiting and improving the Fund’s approach
towards funding health systems strengthening and community
systems strengthening activities.
But because the Global Fund has a narrow remit and because it
is one of several donors and actors that impact upon the health
systems of low and middle income countries, such an approach
towards strategic funding and systems strengthening, can only be
done effectively if the Global Fund is either able to work more
effectively in concert with other development partners, or expand
its scope and remit. What is clear however, from both the research
findings and discussion of this paper is that it is simply
inappropriate to examine the Global Fund’s financing and impact
in isolation of other key determinants of health systems perfor-
mance.
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